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Abstract
This study uses survival analysis to determine how early the indications of bank
failure can be observed. We ﬁnd that banks with high loan to asset and high personal loan to assets ratios are more likely to survive. Older banks and banks with
high real estate and agricultural loans, loan loss allowance, loan charges oﬀ and
non-performing loans to assets ratio are more likely to fail. It is possible to predict survival functions of <50% for failed banks, 3 years or less before failure.
Moreover, we ﬁnd that most of the variables present a behaviour that departs
from Benford’s Law.
Key words: Bank failure prediction; Banks survival analysis; Benford’s law
JEL classiﬁcation: G21, G33
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-629X.2012.00491.x

1. Introduction
This study examines the characteristics of failed commercial banks relative to
non-failed commercial banks in years leading to the bank’s failure. Using historical data of a sample of U.S. commercial banks that failed from 2000 to 2012, this
study uses 6,069 failed bank-year observations to examine the characteristics of
the failed banks from 1984 to 2010, in an attempt to explore the basic ﬁnancial
characteristics of these failed banks compared to non-failed U.S. commercial
banks. The study uses a comprehensive set of ﬁnancial variables over a long perWe acknowledge the excellent research assistance of Ty Dattaray and Chen Zhou, both
graduate students at California State University Fullerton. Fatima Alali acknowledges
the generous research grant support of Mihaylo College of Business & Economics at
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iod of time prior to failure, to diﬀerentiate between failed banks and non-failed
banks and to determine how early the indications of failure can be observed.
Seminal work by Secrist (1938) and Pettway and Sinkey (1980) suggests that
bank accounting data can be used to distinguish sound from unsound banking.
As such, U.S. regulatory bank examinations and capital regulations have focused
on diﬀerent qualities of banks including, earnings quality, capital ratio, default
risk and management competence. Because those banks that fail tend to decay
over time instead of failing all-at-once, identifying banks with ﬁnancial diﬃculties is the ﬁrst step towards achieving failure prevention goal (Pettway and
Sinkey, 1980). This is specially required given the current ﬁnancial crisis that
propagated internationally.
Using a sample of failed and non-failed banks, we conduct a survival analysis and ﬁnd that banks with high loan to asset ratio, agricultural loan to
asset, non-performing loans to loan, loan to deposit ratio, loan loss allowance
to asset ratio, loan charge oﬀs to loan ratio and older banks have shorter
window of survival (are more likely to fail sooner). We also ﬁnd that as loan
variables increase, bank failure increases and survival likelihood decreases.
The same eﬀect is found when real estate loans and agricultural loans
increase and personal loans decrease in the pre-global ﬁnancial crisis period.
Loan variables are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Moreover, we ﬁnd that as
equity to assets increase, bank failure decreases and survival likelihood
increases. Equity to assets is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The study of bank
failure is important for at least two reasons. First, an understanding of factors related to a bank’s failure enables regulatory authorities to detect an
unhealthy bank before the bank becomes problematic and may threaten the
ﬁnancial system. As such, developing a model that can be used to predict a
bank’s failure not only protects from a potential future ﬁnancial crisis but
also reduces the costs to depositors and the deposit insurance funds (Thomson, 1991). Second, the study’s results are relevant to the current ﬁnancial crisis as the economic downturn was initiated by ﬁnancial institutions’ failure.
Hence, it is even more important to develop models that explain and predict
bank failures in up and down economic periods.
We include an additional analysis based on Benford’s law to evaluate whether
some variables could have been manipulated years before failure to conceal the
real situation of the bank. Benford (1938) conducted a study looking at the digital frequencies in tabulated data. He also formulated the expected digital frequencies for ﬁrst and second digits as well as their combinations. If the digital
frequency in the data for failed banks departs from the expectations of Benford,
we can assume that the data were altered to conceal the real economic or ﬁnancial situation of the bank. In the pre-ﬁnancial crisis period, the mean values for
ﬁrst two digits in liabilities are lower than expected, and in operating revenues
and interest revenue are higher than expected, indicating that failed banks might
have manipulated these numbers in that period. These results are statistically
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signiﬁcant. For the post-ﬁnancial crisis period, the manipulation is not observed,
which may be explained by the increased regulatory scrutiny during this period.
The study contributes to existing literature in the following ways. The study
uses a large sample of commercial banks that failed between years 2000 and
2012 and tracks their ﬁnancial characteristics over a long period of time
(1984–2010) to allow for better evaluation of ﬁnancial stability of the bank well
before it actually fails. Prior published studies use data up to 2003 to examine
the characteristics of high default risk banks, Ravi Kumar and Ravi (2007). In
addition, our study uses survival analysis with time variant covariates to determine how long before the bank actually fails, it can be determined to be suspect
to failure. The study, as such, has regulatory and policy implications.
2. Literature review
The prediction of bankruptcy has been extensively researched since late 1960s
starting with Altman. Ravi Kumar and Ravi (2007) present a comprehensive survey of research studies published during 1968–2005, where various statistical and
intelligent techniques were applied to solve the bankruptcy prediction problem.
They indicate that the most precise way of monitoring banks is by conducting
on-site examinations. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement
Act of 1991 (FDICIA) mandates these examinations every 12–18 months. For
that purpose, regulators utilize a six-part rating system to indicate the safety and
soundness of an institution. This rating, referred to as CAMELS, evaluates
banks in the following areas: Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management
expertise, Earnings strength, Liquidity and Sensitivity to market risk. While
CAMELS ratings clearly provide regulators with important information, Cole
and Gunther (1995) show that CAMELS ratings decay rapidly.
Prior studies have established the usefulness of accounting data in identifying
problem/failed banks (e.g. Bell 1997, Boyacioglu et al., 2009, Kolari et al., 2002,
Martin 1977, Olmeda and Fernandez 1997, Swicegood and Clark 2001,
Shumway 2001, Alam et al., 2000, Varetto 1998, Ravi Kumar and Ravi 2007).
In these studies, a sample of distressed banks is compared with a paired or random sample of healthy banks. Using data from several years before a deﬁned
critical date (e.g. failure), ﬁnancial characteristics are identiﬁed, sample banks
are reclassiﬁed, and predictions are made. These studies use diﬀerent classiﬁcation techniques including discriminant analysis, logit, probit, fuzzy logic, neural
systems and support vector machine.
Most of the studies use an ex-post empirical approach and compare characteristics of failed and non-failed banks to predict failure in the future. However,
those studies do not indicate how early the determinants of failure can be predicted. Bell (1997) looks at the usefulness of ﬁnancial statement data to predict
the regulator’s decisions to close commercial banks. He compares logistic regression and neural network computing and shows that neither the logit nor the
neural network model dominates the other in terms of predictive ability, but
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for complex decision-making, the latter method performs better. Using Turkish
data, Boyacioglu et al. (2009) compares the classiﬁcation performance of neural
networks, support vector machines and multivariate statistical methods. They
ﬁnd that the performance of diﬀerent techniques varies with respect to the format of the data set. They also ﬁnd diﬀerent performance in training and validation data sets. Kolari et al. (2002) uses logit analysis and trait recognition to
develop and test a classiﬁcation model. They ﬁnd satisfactory performance in
classiﬁcation, but the trait recognition outperformed logit in most tests in minimizing type I and II errors. Martin (1977) compares independent variables in
1974 to predict failure in 1975 and 1976. They found that 87% of the failed
banks and 88.6% of the non-failed banks were correctly classiﬁed, but 12% of
non-failed banks were classiﬁed as failed as well. Olmeda and Fernandez (1997)
used data from Spain and found that an additive aggregation of combining classiﬁers is better than a single classiﬁer in terms of predicting bankruptcy. Swicegood and Clark (2001) compare discriminant analysis, neural networks and
human judgment to predict bank underperformance. They ﬁnd the neural network and human judgment to be signiﬁcantly better than the discriminant analysis, and the neural networks to be slightly better than the human judgment.
Shumway (2001) develops a hazard model for forecasting bankruptcy that uses
all the information available for a ﬁrm. He ﬁnds that while half of the accounting
ratios used previously are poor predictors, several market-driven variables are
related with bankruptcy. Cole and Wu (2009) use Shumway’s model and test its
accuracy relative to a simple one-period probit model. Their model outperforms
the one-period probit model with and without including macroeconomic variables. In this study, we consider all the information available for each ﬁrm and
we use a regression method with survival data that does not assume independence of the errors. Aﬁﬁ et al. (2004) indicates that survival analysis examines
and models the time it takes for events to occur. This is appropriate for our
study because our interest is not only on the variables that discriminate between
failed and non-failed banks, but also in determining the probability of a bank’s
survival given its ﬁnancial history. Wheelock and Wilson (2000) use a hazard
model with time-varying covariates to identify the characteristics that make
banks more likely to fail or being acquired. They estimate the model with
emphasis on management quality measures and ﬁnd that ineﬃciency increases
the risk of failure while reducing the probability of acquisition. We use variables
identiﬁed in these studies and using a large sample of banks to examine bank’s
survival over a recent time period. Predicting when failure happens can be used
to schedule on-site examinations, early interference programmes or simply to
help regulatory supervisors look closely at risk banks and potentially require correct actions before they signify into bank failures. We also examine susceptibility
of banks to manipulation using Benford’s Law. Nigrini and Mittermaier (1997)
present a comprehensive discussion. Carslaw (1988) hypothesized that when
income is below psychological boundaries, managers would round them up. For
example, 798,000 would be rounded up to 800,000. This manipulation would
 2012 The Authors
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deal an increase of second digits = 0 and a decrease of second digits = 9. He
found that eﬀect using New Zealand data. Thomas (1989) found excess second
digit 0 in quarterly US net income data and the opposite eﬀect for net losses. He
also found that earnings per share are multiples of ﬁve cents more often than
expected. Christian and Gupta (1993) found more individual taxpayers have
incomes in the upper dollars of the tax tables, indicating that taxpayers reduce
taxable income when they are a few dollars above a table step boundary.
Benford’s law was also studied as an aid for auditors (Durtschi et al., 2004;
Nigrini and Mittermaier, 1997; Busta and Weinberg, 1998; Nigrini, 2001).
Finally, Hill (1988) shows that when people make up numbers they do not
conform to Benford’s Law. Therefore, if the tested variables were manipulated
years before failure to conceal the ﬁnancial troubles of the banks, those variables
are not expected to conform to the law.
On the basis of above literature, we identify factors that are signiﬁcant in
determining bank failure, and then we use these variables on a sample of three
banks that failed in January 2011. Furthermore, we match the three healthy
banks, based on bank’s size, age and ﬁscal year-end, with the three failed banks
and compare their survival functions. Finally, we compare the likelihood of survival for Citibank, Bank of America, Wachovia and Wells Fargo 6 years before
2007 and in 2007. We select these banks to illustrate our results because they are
the most publicized ‘‘at risk’’ banks, and they received Troubled Assets Relief
Program (TARP) funds.
3. Data collection
A sample of failed U.S. commercial banks is obtained from the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation website including their FDIC’s certiﬁcate number, on 26 February 2012, for banks that failed from 15 October 2000 to 26 February 2012. We use FDIC certiﬁcate numbers of 452 failed banks to obtain the
annual balance sheet, income statement and capital ratio data from the quarterly
call reports available on Wharton Database, that is, 31 December of each year.
The failed bank sample includes banks that failed and subsequently either liquidated or were acquired by another bank over the period 13 October 2000 until
26 February 2012. The study looks retrospectively at the characteristics of these
failed banks compared to non-failed banks. Similarly, the non-failed banks’
annual data are retrieved from the quarterly call reports available on Wharton
Database for all the banks excluding the failed ones. We hand-collected data for
the missing observations of risk-weighted assets, capital ratios and loan portfolio
variables from both the bank’s annual reports and the FDIC website. Our initial
sample of banks’ observations included 418,092 observations. We delete observations with missing values including return on assets (ROA), loan loss allowance,
total loans, non-performing loans and total deposits. This resulted in 279,165
observations. We deleted additional 1,583 observations for which risk-weighted
assets were missing. We deleted 19,396 observations for which lagged variables
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were missing. This resulted in a ﬁnal 258,186 observations covering the period
1984–2010. Our remaining sample includes 400 diﬀerent failed banks representing a pooled 6,065 failed bank-year observations.1 The sample of non-failed
banks includes 252,117 bank-year observations.
4. Selection of variables
We identify a comprehensive set of predictor variables that are chosen based
on previous studies. These variables are classiﬁed into four groups following the
CAMEL2 ratings:
C. CAPITAL ADEQUACY: These variables were found to be signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent between failed and non-failed banks by Boyacioglu et al. (2009).
C1 was also found signiﬁcant by Kolari et al. (2002), and C3 by Martin
(1977).
C1. Shareholders Equity/Total Assets
C2. Shareholders Equity/Total Loans
C3. Gross Capital/Risk Assets
A. ASSET QUALITY AND LIQUIDITY: Bell (1997) found A1, A2 and A3
signiﬁcant variables in their model to classify failed and non-failed banks.
Martin (1977) found A1 and A11 signiﬁcant. Kolari et al. (2002) found
A7, A10 and A11 to be signiﬁcant.
A1. Total Loans/Total Assets
A2. Non-performing Loans/Total Assets
A3. Agricultural Loans/Total Assets
A4. Personal Loans/Total Assets
A5. Real Estate Loans/Total Assets
A6. Non-performing Loans/Total Loans
A7. Total Loan and Leases/Total Assets
A8. Total Loans/Total Deposits
A9. Allowance for Loan Losses/Total Assets
A10. Net Loan Charge oﬀs/Total Assets
A11. Provision for Loan Losses/Total Assets
1

The 400 banks represent 88.47% of failed banks on the FDIC’s failed banks list.

2

Because we obtain data from the call report using the FDIC certiﬁcate number, we are
unable to obtain market data for the banks in our sample. As such, we only use accounting information to explain and predict bank failures. This is justiﬁable as Pettway and
Sinkey (1980) provides that accounting information generally leads market information,
even though market is eﬃcient in incorporating bank public information into share prices.
We do not consider management variables because of unavailability of data about managers’ compensation as well. However, we include a variable (total salaries and beneﬁts to
total assets) following prior literature.
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E. EARNINGS: Boyacioglu et al. (2009) found E1 and E2 signiﬁcant variables in the classiﬁcation between failed and non-failed banks. Kolari et al.
(2002) found E3 and E4 signiﬁcant, and Bell (1997) found E5 signiﬁcant.
E1. Net Proﬁt/Total Assets
E2. Net Proﬁt/Total Equity
E3. Income before Extraordinary Items/Total Assets
E4. Interest Income/Total Operating Income
E5. Non-interest Expense/Total Operating Income
E6. Salary and Wages Expense/Total Assets
O. Other Characteristics.
O1. Size is included to control for the probability of small bank failure compared to large bank failure. O2 represents bank’s age, and according to
Shumway (2001), age of bank is deﬁned as reporting year relative to the
year it was included in the database = 1976. For example, if a bank is
reporting in year 2000, then age of the bank is 2000–1976 = 24. To avoid
heteroscedasticity, we take the log of age. O3 to O14 are dummy variables
included to capture regional geographic location, regardless of whether a
bank is insured or not by a federal agency.3 O3-O14 dummy variables
identify banks by one of the Federal Reserve bank regions as deﬁned by
FED1-12 as follows: Chicago, New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Cleveland,
Richmond, Atlanta, St. Louis, Kansas City, Minneapolis, Dallas and
San Francisco, respectively. The dependent variable (GAP) is the gap in
years between the year of failure and the reporting year. For example, if a
bank failed in 2008 and it is reporting year 2000, then GAP equals to
8 years.
5. Research design
Following prior studies (e.g. Bell, 1997; Kolari et al., 2002; Martin, 1977;
Olmeda and Fernandez, 1997), we compile a comprehensive set of variables that
are used to determine the characteristics of failed banks compared to those of
the non-failed banks. We obtain coeﬃcients of the variables using the GAP variable where GAP of zero (representing non-failed banks) is a reference category.
We use the Cox method with survival data because our interest not only on
the variables that discriminate between failed and non-failed banks, but also in
the probability of survival of the bank years before failure, based on their ﬁnancial characteristics. Aﬁﬁ et al. (2004) indicates that survival analysis examines
and models the time it takes for events to occur. Therefore, this methodology
allows us to examine explanatory variables that may predict the time leading to

3

All banks in the sample are insured by a federal agency, and as such, we present no
descriptive statistics or include this variable in the analyses.
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bank failure. The non-failed banks represent censored observations because we
know that these banks still survive but may possibly fail in future. Aﬁﬁ et al.
(2004) discuss two survival regression methods, log linear and Cox regression.
We use the latter because it allows testing for the relationship between survival
time (t) and a set of explanatory variables (Xi) that change over time.
The Cox regression does not require the speciﬁcation of a baseline hazard rate
or the estimation of absolute risk, but it requires the deﬁnition of an indicator
and a time variable. The dependent variable is the status variable (failed versus
non-failed), which is analysed in relation with the time variable (GAP) with hazard or survival rates. The time variable measures the duration to the event; therefore, it indicates the number of periods until failure.
The standard Cox regression model is:
hðt; XÞ ¼ h0 ðtÞexpðb1 X1 þ b2 X2 þ    þ bP XP Þ

ð1Þ

where the hazard rate h0(t) does not depend on the Xi variables (covariates) and
exp(b1X1 + b2X2 + … + bPXP) does not depend on t (time). In the basic
model, an explicit assumption is that the explanatory variables do not change
over time. Cox regression implements a proportional hazard ratio h(t, 1)/
h(t, 0) = exp(b1), which is the ratio of two hazard functions. The hazard ratio
(HR) is the estimated eﬀect that group 1 has relative to group 2. The maximum
likelihood method is used to estimate the model parameters and their standard
errors (Aﬁﬁ et al., 2004).
The Cox regression model assumes that the hazard rate increases linearly with
time, conditional on the covariates. When small time intervals are used, the
power of the model increases because there are less chances of type II error. The
covariates can be categorical or continuous, time-ﬁxed or time-dependent. In our
study, because the Xi variables are time-dependent, we estimate time-dependent
covariates. The status variable is deﬁned as an indicator variable that is equal to
one if a bank fails and zero otherwise. The time variable (GAP) equals the gap
between the year of failure and the reporting year. To estimate time-dependent
covariates Cox regression and to avoid simultaneity, we use lag form of
time-dependent covariates (Box-Steﬀensmeier et al., 2004). We centre the lagged
variables (Box-Steﬀensmeier et al., 2004: p65), so that the baseline functions are
estimated for points that exist in the data set; otherwise, the baselines functions
would be misleading.
6. Results
6.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the independent variables used as predictors of bank failure. The total number or observations is 258,186. Besides the
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics (N = 258,186)

C1
C2
C3
A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
A6
A7
A8
A9
A10
A11
E1
E2
E3
E4
E5
E6
O1
O2

Variables

Mean

SD

25th Pctl

Median

75th Pctl

GAP
FD
LEV
EQTOLAN
GCAPTORISK
LOANTOASST
NPLTOASST
AGRTOASST
PERSONTOASST
RETOASST
NPLTOLOAN
LOANLEASETOASST
LOANTODPST
LLATOASST
NCOFFTOASST
LLPTOASST
ROA
ROE
NIBTX
INTREVTOOPINC
NONINTEXTOOPINC
SALARIESTOASST
SIZE
AGE

0.249
0.024
0.096
0.189
0.129
0.583
0.003
0.050
0.084
0.331
0.005
0.583
0.685
0.009
0.000
0.004
0.008
0.054
0.008
0.905
0.402
0.016
11.275
2.969

1.930
0.152
0.033
0.125
0.067
0.157
0.005
0.081
0.073
0.177
0.008
0.157
0.204
0.005
0.000
0.007
0.010
6.225
0.010
0.068
0.132
0.005
1.308
0.372

0.000
0.000
0.075
0.118
0.090
0.483
0.000
0.000
0.034
0.195
0.000
0.483
0.553
0.006
0.000
0.001
0.006
0.062
0.006
0.881
0.310
0.013
10.378
2.639

0.000
0.000
0.089
0.152
0.090
0.598
0.001
0.009
0.065
0.312
0.001
0.598
0.689
0.008
0.000
0.002
0.010
0.104
0.010
0.920
0.380
0.015
11.125
2.996

0.000
0.000
0.109
0.212
0.144
0.696
0.003
0.067
0.112
0.450
0.006
0.696
0.813
0.011
0.000
0.004
0.013
0.142
0.013
0.948
0.470
0.019
11.976
3.296

All continuous variables are winsorized at top and bottom 1%. GAP: the diﬀerence between the failure year and the reporting year; C1. LEV: equity to total assets; C2. EQTOLOAN: equity to total
loans; C3. GCAPTORISK: ter1 + tier 2 divided by risk-weighted assets; A1. LOANTOASST: total
loans to total assets; A2. NPLTOASST: non-performing loans to total assets; A3. AGRTOASST:
agricultural loans to total assets; A4. PERSONTOASST: personal loans to total assets; A5. RETOASST: real estate in mortgages, industrial and commercial loans to total assets; A6. NPLTOLOAN:
non-performing loans to total loans; A7. LOANLEASETOASST: total loans and leases to total
assets; A8. LOANTODPST: total loans to total deposits; A9. LLATOASST: loan loss allowance to
total assets; A10. NCOFFTOASST: charge oﬀs recoveries to total assets; E1. ROA: net income to
total assets; E2. ROE: net income before extraordinary items to equity; E3: NIBTX: net income
before extraordinary items to total assets; E4. INTREVTOOPINC: interest revenue to operating
income; E5. NONINTEXTOOPINC: non-interest expense to operating income; E6. SALARIESTOASST: employees salaries and beneﬁts to total assets; O1. SIZE: the log of total assets; O2. AGE: the
log of age of bank in year of reporting, starting from 1976; and O3–O14: indicator variables for
Federal Reserve Bank Region are also included in test model but are unreported for brevity.

mean, descriptive statistics of the 25th and 75th percentiles are included. Overall,
our sample consists of large banks with average log of total assets of 11.28. The
sample banks are on average proﬁtable (average ROA = 0.8%) and average
gross capital ratio of about 13%. Average leverage (LEV) is 9.6%. The banks,
on average, have non-performing loans to assets ratios (NPLTOASST) of 0.30%
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and average loan loss allowance (LLATOASSET) of 0.9%, while average percentage of non-performing loans to loans (NPLTOLOAN) is 0.50%. Average
net charge oﬀs to assets (NCOFFTOASST) is 0.0005%. The average total loan
portfolio to assets (LOANTOASST) is 58.3%, with real estate loans (RETOASST) representing an average of 33.1%, personal loans including credit cards
(PERSONTOASST) 8.4% and agricultural loans (AGRTOASST) 5.0%.4 Interest revenue to total operating income (operating income is sum of interest and
non-interest revenues, as deﬁned in the literature) represents average of 90.5%,
and non-interest expense to operating income (NONINTEXPTOOPINC) is
40.2%. The average loan to deposits (LOANTODPST) ratio is 68.5%, and average employee salaries and beneﬁts to assets (SALARIESTOASST) is 1.6%. In
addition, we ﬁnd that the diﬀerent Federal Reserve regions are represented in
the sample with 21.3% banks in Chicago Federal Reserve region, about 14.8%
in the Kansas City Federal Reserve region and about 13% in Minneapolis
Federal Reserve region.
Correlations5 among variables show that there is a signiﬁcant positive association between SIZE, AGE, ROA, loan to assets (LOANTOASST), real estate
loans to assets (RETOASST), loans to deposits (LOANTODPST), loan loss
allowance to assets (LLATOASST) and net charge oﬀs to assets (NCOTOASST). We ﬁnd that size is negatively and signiﬁcantly correlated with LEV,
non-performing loans to assets (NPLTOASST), agricultural loans (AGRTOASST), personal loans including credit card debt (PERSONTOASST), noninterest expense to operating income (NONINTEXPTOOPINC) and interest
revenue to operating income (INTREVTOOPINC). LEV and gross capital ratio
to risk-weighted assets (GCAPTORISK) are positively and signiﬁcantly correlated as expected. These two variables are negatively and signiﬁcantly correlated
with non-performing loans to assets (NPLTOASST), total loans to deposit
(LOANTODPST), loan loss allowance to total assets (LLATOASST) and loan
charge oﬀs (NCOTOASST). We ﬁnd that (GCAPTORISK) is positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with real estate loans (RETOASST), AGE and non-interest
expense to operating income (NONINTEXPTOOPINC). We also ﬁnd that
leverage (LEV) is negatively and signiﬁcantly related to real estate loans

4

Because of data unavailability, we do not include other loan portfolios; such as construction and industrial loans or other assets in the analyses. Cole and White (2011) identify construction real estate loans as perhaps the most important determinant of bank
failure in 2009. Construction real estate loans are included in the real estate loans in our
analyses. However, including the construction and industrial loans (not real estate loans)
and mortgage baked assets in the tests results in reducing the sample to 114,296 of which
only 1,601 observations are classiﬁed as failed banks (event). Cox survival analysis shows
positive but insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients on both of these variables. These results are not
reported but are available upon request. Our test sample of 258,186 observations includes
46.48% of total 58.31% of loans to total assets.

5

Correlation matrix is not reported and is available upon request from the authors.

 2012 The Authors
Accounting and Finance  2012 AFAANZ

F. Alali, S. Romero/Accounting and Finance 53 (2013) 1149–1174

1159

(RETOASST), where leverage is measured by equity to asset ratio. Spearman’s
correlation coeﬃcients are smaller in magnitude and less signiﬁcant than
Pearson’s correlation coeﬃcients.
Table 2 presents the diﬀerences in means of the variables between failed and
non-failed banks. Similar to Bell (1997) and Martin (1977), we ﬁnd that the
variables AGRTOASST and NONINTEXTOOPINC are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
between failed and non-failed banks. Similar to Kolari et al. (2002), we ﬁnd INTREVTOOPINC are signiﬁcantly lower for failed banks than non-failed banks.
In addition, we ﬁnd that PERSONTOASST, RETOASSTLOANTODPST,
LLATOASST, SALARIESTOASST and AGE are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
between failed and non-failed banks. Consistent with expectations, failed banks
have higher proportion of their total assets in loans, especially real estate loans.
The proportion of agricultural and personal loans is lower for failed banks compared to non-failed banks. Because our sample includes failures until February
2012, this eﬀect might be related to the recent crisis. Relative to non-failed banks,
failed banks have lower equity to loans (EQTOLOAN) and lower equity to total
assets (LEV), and the diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at <1% level. Failed
banks also have higher non-performing loans to total loans (NPLTOLOAN),
higher non-performing loans to assets (NPLTOASST) and higher net charge oﬀs
(NCOFFTOASST), with diﬀerences only statistically signiﬁcant for net loan
charge oﬀs.
Salaries and wages (SALARIESTOASST), non-interest expense to total operating revenue (NONINTEXTOOPINC) and loans to deposits (LOANTODPST)
are higher for failed banks than non-failed banks; and interest revenue to total
operating revenue (INTREVTOOPINC) is lower for failed than for non-failed
banks, and the diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant. We also ﬁnd that the size
of failed banks is on average larger than the size of non-failed banks with means
of 11.59 and 11.27, respectively. Moreover, we ﬁnd that Chicago, Atlanta, Minneapolis, Dallas and San Francisco Federal Reserve regions have signiﬁcantly
higher percentage of bank failure compared to the other Federal Reserve
regions.
Table 3 shows the frequency distribution of GAP variables for failed banks.
The sample includes banks data between 1 and 27 years before failure. More
than 91% of failed banks have data prior to failure, between 2 and 24 years.
There are four bank-year observations for 27 years prior to failure, 36 bank-year
observations for 26 years prior to failure and 87 bank-year observations for
25 years prior to failure.
6.2. Cox regression analysis
We estimate the Cox regression model using the comprehensive set of variables
discussed earlier. We use a backward elimination method to retain in the model
only those variables that are signiﬁcant at the 10% level. The results of the estimated model and the eliminated variables are provided in Table 4. Table 4
 2012 The Authors
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C1
C2
C3
A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
A6
A7
A8
A9
A10
A11
E1
E2
E3
E4
E5

LEV
EQTOLOAN
GCAPTORISK
LOANTOASST
NPLTOASST
AGRTOASST
PERSONTOASST
RETOASST
NPLTOLOAN
LOANLEASETOASST
LOANTODPST
LLATOASST
NCOFFTOASST
LLPTOASST
ROA
ROE
NIBTX
INTREVTOOPINC
NONINTEXTOOPINC

Variables
0.092
0.154
0.121
0.666
0.003
0.023
0.060
0.454
0.005
0.666
0.795
0.011
0.000
0.007
0.004
)0.143
0.003
0.899
0.451

Mean

Failed banks
(N = 6,069)

0.034
0.104
0.054
0.154
0.005
0.057
0.067
0.207
0.009
0.154
0.206
0.007
0.000
0.011
0.016
13.856
0.016
0.079
0.159

SD
0.097
0.190
0.129
0.581
0.003
0.051
0.085
0.328
0.005
0.581
0.683
0.009
0.000
0.004
0.008
0.059
0.008
0.905
0.401

Mean
0.033
0.125
0.067
0.156
0.005
0.081
0.073
0.175
0.008
0.156
0.203
0.005
0.000
0.007
0.010
5.921
0.010
0.068
0.132

SD

Non-failed banks
(N = 252,117)

Table 2
Univariate t-test of diﬀerences between failed and non-failed banks subsamples*

t-value
)10.590
)26.400
)10.650
42.480
0.880
)37.040
)28.200
46.990
)2.750
42.480
41.810
18.470
6.410
19.770
)22.620
)1.130
)22.580
)5.840
24.470

Mean Diﬀ.
)0.005
)0.036
)0.007
0.085
0.000
)0.028
)0.025
0.126
0.000
0.085
0.112
0.002
0.000
0.003
)0.005
)0.202
)0.005
)0.006
0.050

<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.380
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.006
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.258
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001

Pr > |t|
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SALARIESTOASST
SIZE
AGE

0.017
11.585
3.121

0.006
1.383
0.340

0.016
11.268
2.965

0.005
1.305
0.372

SD

Mean

Mean

SD

Non-failed banks
(N = 252,117)

Failed banks
(N = 6,069)

0.001
0.317
0.156

Mean Diﬀ.

15.780
17.680
35.260

t-value

<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001

Pr > |t|

*Assuming unequal variances. All continuous variables are winsorized at top and bottom 1%. GAP: the diﬀerence between the failure year and the reporting
year; C1. LEV: equity to total assets; C2. EQTOLOAN: equity to total loans; C3. GCAPTORISK: ter1 + tier 2 divided by risk-weighted assets; A1. LOANTOASST: total loans to total assets; A2. NPLTOASST: non-performing loans to total assets; A3. AGRTOASST: agricultural loans to total assets; A4.
PERSONTOASST: personal loans to total assets; A5. RETOASST: real estate in mortgages, industrial and commercial loans to total assets; A6. NPLTOLOAN: non-performing loans to total loans; A7. LOANLEASETOASST: total loans and leases to total assets; A8. LOANTODPST: total loans to total
deposits; A9. LLATOASST: loan loss allowance to total assets; A10. NCOFFTOASST: charge oﬀs recoveries to total assets; E1. ROA: net income to total
assets; E2. ROE: net income before extraordinary items to equity; E3: NIBTX: net income before extraordinary items to total assets; E4. INTREVTOOPINC: interest revenue to operating income; E5. NONINTEXTOOPINC: non-interest expense to operating income; E6. SALARIESTOASST: employees salaries and beneﬁts to total assets; O1. SIZE: the log of total assets; O2. AGE: the log of age of bank in year of reporting, starting from 1976; and O3-O14:
indicator variables for Federal Reserve Bank Region are also included in test model but are unreported for brevity.

E6
O1
O2

Variables

Table 2 (continued)
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Table 3
Failed bank-years length of time between failure year and reporting year (GAP)
GAP

No. of Obs.

% of Obs.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
Total

384
390
382
363
346
323
311
296
281
264
240
228
220
207
202
192
187
178
175
170
161
156
149
137
87
36
4
6069

6.33
6.43
6.29
5.98
5.70
5.32
5.12
4.88
4.63
4.35
3.95
3.76
3.62
3.41
3.33
3.16
3.08
2.93
2.88
2.80
2.65
2.57
2.46
2.26
1.43
0.59
0.07
100.00

GAP is deﬁned as diﬀerence between reporting year and failure year.

shows that LEV, EQTOLOAN, LOANTOASST, AGRTOASST, PERSONLOAN, NPLTOLOAN, LOANTODPST, LLATOASST, NCOFFTOASST,
ROA, NONINTEXTOOPINC and AGE are signiﬁcant at the 10% level or better. The coeﬃcients of LEV, LOANTOASST, LOANTOASST, PERSONTOASST, ROA and NONINTEXTOOPINC are negative and signiﬁcant at the 1%
level, suggesting that hazard (bank failure) decreases and survival likelihood
increases as these variables increase. Therefore, an increase in these covariates
appears to be associated with a decrease in risk of failure. In addition, the coeﬃcients of EQTOLOAN, AGRTOASST, NPLTOASST, LOANTODPST, LLATOASST, NCOFFTOASST and AGE are positive and signiﬁcant at 10% or
better. This indicates that for each of these time-varying covariates, hazard (bank
failure) increases and survival likelihood decreases as the covariate increases. The
corresponding hazard ratio shows the rate of the failure for an increase in one
unit of the covariate. We ﬁnd that the hazard ratio for ROA is zero. The hazard
 2012 The Authors
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<0.0001
0.000
0.048
0.006
0.027
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.013
<0.0001
0.003
<0.0001

)3.07
0.773
)0.425
0.579
)0.521
7.93
0.686
13.698
647.112
)9.233
)0.331
13.751

LEV
EQTOLOAN
LOANTOASST
AGRTOASST
PERSONTOASST
NPLTOLOAN
LOANTODPST
LLATOASST
NCOFFTOASST
ROA
NONINTEXTOOPINC
AGE
Criterion

0.046
2.167
0.654
1.784
0.594
2780.454
1.986
889281.100
109000 + E9
0.000
0.718
937977.400

Hazard ratio
RETOASST
SIZE
INTREVTOOPIN
SALARIESTOASST
NPLTOASST

With
covariates
80164.94
80188.94
80269.471
Pr > v2
<0.0001
<0.0001

Without
covariates
94484.779
94484.779
94484.779
v2
14319.839
6347.029

Variable removed

1
2
3
4
5

Step
0.004
0.009
0.153
1.479
2.225

Wald

0.952
0.923
0.696
0.224
0.136

Pr > v2

Variables used in the Cox regression are mean-centred lagged variables (Box-Steﬀensmeier et al., 2004). GAP: the diﬀerence between the failure year and the reporting year;
C1. LEV: equity to total assets; C2. EQTOLOAN: equity to total loans; C3. GCAPTORISK: ter1 + tier 2 divided by risk-weighted assets; A1. LOANTOASST: total loans
to total assets; A2. NPLTOASST: non-performing loans to total assets; A3. AGRTOASST: agricultural loans to total assets; A4. PERSONTOASST: personal loans to total
assets; A5. RETOASST: real estate in mortgages, industrial and commercial loans to total assets; A6. NPLTOLOAN: non-performing loans to total loans; A7. LOANLEASETOASST: total loans and leases to total assets; A8. LOANTODPST: total loans to total deposits; A9. LLATOASST: loan loss allowance to total assets; A10.
NCOFFTOASST: charge oﬀs recoveries to total assets; E1. ROA: net income to total assets; E2. ROE: net income before extraordinary items to equity; E3: NIBTX: net
income before extraordinary items to total assets; E4. INTREVTOOPINC: interest revenue to operating income; E5. NONINTEXTOOPINC: non-interest expense to operating income; E6. SALARIESTOASST: employees salaries and beneﬁts to total assets; O1. SIZE: the log of total assets; O2. AGE: the log of age of bank in year of reporting, starting from 1976; and O3–O14: indicator variables for Federal Reserve Bank Region are included but are not reported. Indicator variables for years are also included
but are not reported.

)2 LOG L
AIC
SBC
Testing global null hypothesis: BETA = 0
Test
Likelihood ratio
Wald

Pr > v2

Coef.

Variables

Table 4
Cox survival regression estimation (N = 258,186)
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Figure 1 Predicted survival function for the pooled sample.

ratios for EQTOLOAN, AGRTOASST, NPLTOLOAN, LOANTODPST,
LLATOASST, NCOFFTOASST and AGE are larger than 1.0, indicating an
increase in the rate of the bank failure occurring for a one-unit increase in the covariate, after controlling for other covariates in the model. The hazard ratio for
LEV, LOANTOASST, PERSONTOASST and NONINTEXTOOPINC is
<1.0, indicating that after controlling for other covariates in the model, an
increase in the rate of bank failure occurs for one-unit decrease in the covariate.
The overall model ﬁt statistics show that the model is signiﬁcant at <1%, using
partial likelihood test ratio and Wald ratio.
Figure 1 shows the baseline survival function. The survival function represents
the probability of surviving plotted against time. The graph shows that at
GAP = 0, by deﬁnition, all banks are surviving, and thus survival probability is
100%. When a bank fails, the percentage of banks that are surviving declines.
The baseline survival function shows that as time increases, the probability of
surviving decreases. When GAP = 12, the probability of surviving decreases to
85%, at GAP = 13, probability of surviving is down to 73%, at GAP = 14,
the probability of surviving is <55% and probability of surviving falls to 30%
at GAP = 15.
As a following step, we use the Cox proportional hazards regression results to
obtain the predicted survival curves for speciﬁc covariate values.6 In particular,
we identify three banks that failed in January 2011 according to the FDIC failed

6

Figures of survival functions for failed banks (A, B and C) and their matched three
healthy banks are not reported for brevity and are available upon request.
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banks list. For each of these banks, we compute the survival estimates. The speciﬁc covariate values used are from year 2007 owing to data availability.7
We ﬁnd that the probability of bank A’s survival is decreased to 35% at
GAP = 3, and to 15% at GAP = 4. The probability of bank B’s survival is
decreased to about 39% at GAP = 3 and to 18% at GAP = 4. Bank C’s survival function is marginally better than that of bank A and is comparable to
bank B. In particular, we note that the probability of bank C’s survival is
decreased to 40% at GAP = 3, to 18% at GAP = 4 and to <10% at
GAP = 5. For the three banks, the predicted survival function is about or
<5% at GAP = 6. These results suggest that it is possible to predict bank failures between 3 and 4 years before the actual failure. Comparing these predicted
banks’ survival functions to the Cox survival function estimation, only at
GAP = 15, survival function decreases to <50% for the latter.
To obtain conﬁdence in the results documented earlier, we identify three
healthy banks that are matched with the three failed banks (A, B and C) in terms
of size, age and ﬁscal year-end. Because we cannot predict that those healthy
banks are going to survive in the future, we assume that they failed 6 years ago
and estimate the predicted survival functions. We ﬁnd that compared to the
failed banks, the potential failure of the three matched healthy banks is lower
until GAP = 4, after that, the probability of survival falls also below 10% for
the three healthy banks. The probability of the ﬁrst healthy bank’s survival at
GAP = 3 is higher than 42%, and 20% at GAP = 5 (compared with 35% and
15%, respectively, for bank A). The probability of the second healthy bank’s survival was 35% at GAP = 3 and falls to 15% at GAP = 4 compared with failed
bank B above. Lastly, the survival function for the third healthy bank is 84% at
GAP = 1 and 65% at GAP = 2.
Finally, we study the likelihood of failure for Bank of America (BAO), Citibank (Citi), Wachovia (WAC) and Wells Fargo (WF) 6 years before 2007 and in
2007. Figure 2 presents the likelihood of failure of BAO, Citi, WAC and WF
6 years before 2007. The likelihood of survival for BOA was higher than 80%
for GAP = 4, and over 80% for GAP = 5. This likelihood drops to 70% for
GAP = 6. The likelihood of survival is lower for WAC and Citi when compared
to BOA. WF shows likelihood of failure, with 76% survival rate at GAP = 4,
61% at GAP = 5 and under 50% at GAP = 7, while both Wachovia and Citi
Bank have <50% survival likelihood at GAP = 4. However, log rank tests
show statistically insigniﬁcant diﬀerences between survival functions of WF, Citi
and BOA. Our results comparing the predicted survival functions of Citi and
BOA in 2007 show that the predicted survival function of Citi is lower than that

7

In the model, the three banks were classiﬁed as censored (not failed), since they failed in
2011. The predicted survival functions are materially the same if we exclude them from
the censored and include them in the failed sample.

 2012 The Authors
Accounting and Finance  2012 AFAANZ

1166

F. Alali, S. Romero/Accounting and Finance 53 (2013) 1149–1174
1.2
Bank of America
CITI BANK

1

Wachovia
Wells Fargo

Axis title

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112131415161718192021222324252627

Figure 2 Predicted survival functions for BOA v.s. Citi Bank, Wachovia & Wells Fargo.

of BOA. Retrospectively speaking, Citi was on the verge of failure without
government bailout in 2008.
6.3. Benford’s law results
To complement our Cox regression analyses, two additional analyses were
produced. First, we look at the behaviour of the ﬁrst digit in the list of variables.
Benford’s Law is an expected distribution of digits in tabulated data on the basis
that when the data are ranked from smallest to largest, they form a geometric
sequence. Raimi (1976) observed that almost all sequences deﬁned by linear
recursions will follow Benford’s Law. He also observed that if a sequence does
not conform to Benford’s Law, there is no constant that multiplication would
cause it to become a Benford set. As pointed by Nigrini (1996), ‘‘conformity of a
data set to Benford’s Law does not necessarily imply naturalness, but non-conformity should raise some level of suspicion.’’ Indeed, Hill (1988) showed that
invented numbers did not conform to this law.8 If manipulation occurs on variables representing total assets, total deposits and revenues, it is expected that the
numbers reported will be larger than the real ones. In this scenario, the percentage of large numbers expected according to Benford’s Law will be less than the
observed, and the percentage of small numbers expected will be more than
observed. Therefore, the diﬀerence between observed and expected will have a
8

Please refer to Nigrini (1996) for the expected frequency of the ﬁrst digit according to
Benford’s Law.
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negative sign for small numbers and a positive sign for large numbers. Opposite
is the behaviour expected for liabilities and expenses. Therefore, the observed
small numbers will be more than the expected according to Benford’s Law (positive sign), and the observed large numbers will be less than the expected (negative
sign).We observe that for years 1–6 before a bank’s failure, most of the observed
variables present a behaviour that departs from Benford’s Law and could indicate manipulation, although very few are statistically signiﬁcant as shown in
Table 5.
Second, we follow Nigrini (1996) and we compute the distortion factor model
(DF). The DF is calculated as the diﬀerence in the mean of the observed ﬁrst
two digits and compared with the expected mean according to Benford’s Law.
The expected mean is 39.08. If the expenses and liabilities were manipulated, we
expect the mean observed to be lower than the mean expected. Contrary, if the
revenues and assets accounts were manipulated, we expect the mean observed to
be higher than the expected according to Benford’s Law. The results of the years
1–6 before bank’s failure indicate that non-interest revenue has mean values
higher than expected during three of those 6 years. Total liabilities have mean
values lower than expected in all 6 years, and operating expenses have mean values lower than expected in three of the 6 years as reported in Table 6, although
these results are not statistically signiﬁcant. This analysis indicates that failed
banks might increase their revenue and decrease their liabilities years before
failure to conceal their ﬁnancial diﬃculties.
6.4. Sensitivity analysis9
6.4.1. Size eﬀect
The political cost hypothesis dictates that large banks are more visible and historically have been ‘‘too big to fail’’. To test whether large banks are more likely
to survive, we estimate the survival functions for large and small banks subsamples. We use the log of total assets of higher than or equal to sample median
(11.125) to classify a bank as large; otherwise, a bank is classiﬁed as small. Our
sample includes 129,065 bank-year observations classiﬁed as small banks of
which 3,754 bank-year observations failed, and 129,121 bank-year observations
classiﬁed as large banks of which 2,315 bank-year observations failed. Survival
functions for small and large banks provide that large banks have higher rates of
survival than small banks. As a small bank fails, the survival probability of
another small bank declines more than when a large bank fails. Signiﬁcance tests
of log rank, Wilcoxon rank and -2 log likelihood ratio (chi-square values of

9

For brevity, sensitivity analyses results are not reported and are available upon request
from the authors.
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*Grey indicates conﬂict with Benford’s law, and dark grey indicates signiﬁcance.
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Table 6
Benford’s Law – Distortion factor (DF) for analysis of ﬁrst two digits*

Total assets
Expected avg
Average two digits
DF
Total deposits
Expected avg
Average two digits
DF
Non-interest revenue
Expected avg
Average two digits
DF
Income before tax
Expected avg
Average two digits
DF
Total liabilities
Expected avg
Average two digits
DF
Total interest expense
Expected avg
Average two digits
DF
Operating expenses
Expected avg
Average two digits
DF

GAP 1

GAP 2

GAP 3

GAP 4

GAP 5

GAP 6

39.08
37.16
)0.049

39.08
37.43
)0.004

39.08
38.31
)0.020

39.08
37.44
)0.042

39.08
36.70
)0.061

39.08
37.03
)0.052

39.08
37.06
)0.052

39.08
36.25
)0.007

39.08
37.36
)0.044

39.08
36.33
)0.070

39.08
37.10
)0.051

39.08
36.66
)0.062

39.08
39.65
0.015

39.08
38.50
)0.005

39.08
39.57
0.013

39.08
39.76
0.017

39.08
38.92
)0.004

39.08
39.03
)0.001

39.08
41.39
0.059

39.08
38.82
)0.007

39.08
38.29
)0.020

39.08
37.20
)0.048

39.08
36.03
)0.078

39.08
37.42
)0.004

39.08
37.16
)0.049

39.08
37.43
)0.004

39.08
38.31
)0.020

39.08
37.44
)0.042

39.08
36.7
)0.0061

39.08
37.34
)0.005

39.08
38.18
)0.023

39.08
39.87
.020

39.08
39.54
0.012

39.08
40.76
0.043

39.08
39.17
0.002

39.08
38.45
)0.016

39.08
38.84
)0.006

39.08
39.27
0.005

39.08
38.25
)0.022

39.08
38.92
)0.004

39.08
40.92
0.047

39.08
41.42
0.006

*Grey indicates conﬂict with Benford’s Law.

72.33, 82.57 and 21.17, respectively) indicate statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in
the survival functions of large and small banks at less than 1% level.
6.4.2. Partitioning the data by pre- and post-periods of the recent
global ﬁnancial crisis
We examine the eﬀect of the global ﬁnancial crisis (GFC) on identifying the
characteristics of failed commercial banks. This is important because the variables that explain bank failure in the post-GFC period may be diﬀerent from the
variables that explain bank failure in the pre-GFC period.10 As such, we break
10

We thank the anonymous reviewer for bringing up these issues.
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down the total sample and run survival analyses on the subsamples of the two
periods. We identify post-GFC period as 2008–2010 and pre-GFC period as
2004–2007.11 The post-GFC subsample includes a total of 21,413 bank-year
observations of which 674 bank-year observations represent failed banks (i.e.
event). The pre-GFC subsample includes a total of 30,730 bank-year observations of which 1,348 bank-year observations represent failed banks (i.e. event).
The estimated Cox survival models deal diﬀerent variables for these periods. In
the pre-GFC period, LOANTOASST, AGRTOASST, PERSONLOAN,
LOANTODPST, NONINTEXTOOPINC, AGE, TETTOASST and NPLTOASST are signiﬁcant at the 10% level or better. LOANTOASST, PERSONTOASST and NONINTEXTOOPINC are negative, suggesting that bank failure
decreases and survival increases as these variables increase. The coeﬃcients of
AGRTOASST, LOANTODEPST, RETTOASST, NPLTOASST and AGE are
positive, indicating that for each of these covariates, bank failure increases and
survival likelihood decreases as the variable increases. The hazard ratio for AGRTOASST, LOANTODPST, RETTOASST and AGE are larger than 1.0, indicating an increase in the rate of failure for a one-unit increase in the covariate,
after controlling for other covariates in the model. The hazard ratio for LOANTOASST, PERSONTOASST, NONINTEXTOOPINC, NPLTOASST and
AGE are smaller than 1.0, indicating an increase in the rate of bank failure for
one-unit decrease in the covariate, after controlling for other covariates in the
model. For the post-GFC period, LEV, LOANTOASST, LOANTODPST,
LLATOASST and AGE are signiﬁcant at 10% level or better. LEV and LOANTOASST have negative coeﬃcients, indicating a decrease in bank failure or an
increase in the likelihood of survival with an increase in these variables. LOANTOASST, LLATOASST and AGE are positive, indicating an increase in bank
failure or a decrease in likelihood of survival when these variables increase. The
hazard ratio for LOANTODPST and AGE is larger than 1.0, indicating, after
controlling for other covariates in the model, an increase in the rate of failure for
a one-unit increase in the covariate. The hazard ratio for LEV, LOANTOASST
and LLATOASST is smaller than 1.0, indicating an increase in the rate of failure
for one-unit decrease in the covariate, after controlling for other covariates in
the model. The overall model ﬁt statistics show that both models are signiﬁcant
at <1% level using partial likelihood test ratio and Wald ratio.
Moreover, we apply Benford’s law to the data of failed and non-failed banks
in the pre- and post-GFC period to study whether the data conform to it, or
whether we ﬁnd signs of manipulation in those periods. In pre-GFC period, the
average of the ﬁrst two digits of operating revenue and interest revenue of failed
11
We select pre-GFC period to cover 3 years prior to 2008 because this is relatively
homogenous period of time in ﬁnancial market. Including years prior to 2004 is potentially contaminated by passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, accounting scandals periods in early 2000s, new capital requirements in the 1990s and the saving and loans
debacles in the 1980s.
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banks are higher than expected according to Benford’s law. On the contrary, the
average of the ﬁrst two digits of total liabilities is lower than expected. These
results, which are statistically signiﬁcant, indicate that banks may have manipulated those ﬁgures to disguise their poor ﬁnancial performance. The same eﬀect
is not observable for non-failed banks. This group presents small departures
from Benford’s law, but the results are not signiﬁcant, except for interest
expense, which indicates evidence of manipulation. In the post-GFC period, the
only signiﬁcant departure from Benford’s law is in the average of the ﬁrst two
digits of total liabilities. Both failed and non-failed banks have averages that are
signiﬁcantly lower than would be expected of data conforming to Benford’s law.
In terms of ﬁnancial statements information disclosed in the pre- and post-GFC
periods, as measured by conformation to Benford’s law, we do not ﬁnd evidence
that indicates manipulation after crisis, except for interest expense, and we do
ﬁnd evidence of manipulation in the pre-GFC period. Lack of evidence of
manipulation may indicate the increased bank regulatory scrutiny that may be a
deterrent to manipulate in the post-crisis period.
7. Conclusions
The study uses survival analysis to identify variables that discriminate between
failed and non-failed banks and the survivorship of the banks. We ﬁnd that large
banks, banks with higher loan to asset ratio, ROA, higher equity to assets,
higher non-interest expense to operating income and higher personal loan to
asset ratio are more likely to survive and that older banks and banks with high
loan loss allowance, high loan loss charge oﬀs, high non-performing loans to
asset, high loan to deposit ratio and high equity to loan ratio are more likely to
fail. In addition, we ﬁnd that the survivor function for large banks is higher than
for small banks, using large–small subsamples. We also ﬁnd that it is possible to
predict survival functions for failed banks with <50% probability of survival,
3 years or earlier before actual failure. We ﬁnd that our model is signiﬁcant at
conventional levels. Our pre- and post-GFC results show that variables that predict bank failure are diﬀerent in these two periods. We ﬁnd that high agricultural
loans to assets, real estate loans to assets, non-performing loans to assets and
loan to deposit ratios increase probability of bank failure. Moreover, we ﬁnd
that high loan to deposit ratio and loan loss allowance to asset ratio increase
probability of bank failure in post-GFC. We ﬁnd that high equity to asset ratio
improves bank survivability in post-GFC period but does not aﬀect bank’s survivability in pre-GFC period. We ﬁnd that older banks are more likely to fail in
both the pre- and post-GFC.
Our Benford’s Law results show that for years 1–6 before failure, most of the
observed variables present a behaviour that departs from Benford’s Law and
could indicate manipulation. Non-interest revenue has mean values higher than
expected during three of those 6 years, total liabilities have mean values lower
than expected in all 6 years and operating expenses have mean values lower than
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expected in three of the 6 years, showing that failed banks might increase their
revenue and decrease their liabilities years before failure to conceal their ﬁnancial
diﬃculties. In the pre-GFC period, the mean values for ﬁrst two digits in liabilities are lower than expected, and in operating revenue and interest revenue are
higher than expected, indicating that failed banks might have manipulated there
disclosures in that period. These results are statistically signiﬁcant. For the postGFC period, the manipulation is not observed.
Our results are limited given the model speciﬁcation. In this analysis, we used
CAMEL indicators as explanatory variables. Further analyses may be carried
out to test whether there are relationships between CAMEL ratings and the
model predicting ability. We yet believe that our large sample is representative of
the population of failed banks and the results presented are relevant and potentially may have regulatory implications.
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